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RULE 706: AN UNDERUTILIZED TOOL TO BE USED WHEN
PARTISAN EXPERTS BECOME “HIRED GUNS”
JUDGE BRADFORD H. CHARLES*
DURING the past fifteen years as a trial judge, I have begun to care-fully look at the faces of jurors when the inevitable “How much are
you paid?” question is asked of an expert.  The expressions I routinely
observe range from shock to disgust.  I have seen jurors glance at one
another and roll their eyes.  I have observed many jurors shake their heads
in disbelief.  I can almost hear these citizens thinking: “He is nothing but a
hired gun.”  While I know that experts play an important role in educating
jurors about matters that are beyond common understanding, I have in-
creasingly observed that cases are won because of the quality of lay-factual
witnesses and not the eloquence of the partisan experts.
Perhaps because my anecdotal observations have been shared by
others, the cadence of criticism regarding America’s utilization of partisan
experts has begun to approach snare-drum intensity.  In this commentary,
I will endeavor to chronicle some of the criticism that is being leveled at
our current system of adversarial expert testimony.  I will then identify an
alternative that is finding increasing support among academicians and
judges—the appointment of independent experts by the court.
I. AMERICA’S SYSTEM OF PARTISAN EXPERTS
The American judicial system is based upon the precept that truth
can best be determined within an adversarial system.  Proponents of the
partisan expert system argue, with some justification, that truth can be
discerned when a jury is presented with two opposing viewpoints that can
each be tested through the crucible of cross-examination.  Yet, many now
believe that our adversarial paradigm does not translate well to scientific
analysis and may be detrimental to a court’s fundamental truth-gathering
purpose in a science-dependent dispute.
Outside the United States, most of the world’s expert witnesses are
selected by judges and are intended to be neutral and independent.  For
example, in Japan,
[e]xperts are called by, and asked to assist, the judge in making
his or her determinations in the case, when necessary. . . .  If the
* Bradford H. Charles is a Pennsylvania Trial Judge for the 52nd Judicial
District (Lebanon County).  Before taking the bench in 2000, Judge Charles
enjoyed an active courtroom practice, both as a prosecutor and civil litigator.
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court decides an expert is needed, it selects the expert and pro-
vides him or her with the necessary case materials to help decide
the contested expert issue.1
Similarly, in Germany,
 [a]fter both parties make claims in the pleadings stage of the
case, the judge must determine whether an expert will be neces-
sary to decide a contested issue.  If so, the judge will appoint an
expert to assist him or her in the determination of the contested
issue.  To determine who to select, the judge may request the
parties to nominate an expert, but more often will select the ex-
pert himself or herself.2
Even in England, the incubator for American common law, a process has
been created to promote independent court-appointed experts: “In cer-
tain cases, the court may request that a single expert address an issue
rather than each party address it separately.  The selection of the expert
may be done by the parties or, if they cannot agree, by the judge based on
a list provided by the parties.”3  Generally, European legal scholars view
the American system of partisan experts with curiosity and thinly veiled
disdain.4
In the world of American legal academia, the partisan expert process
has long been the subject of criticism.  In 1901, Judge Learned Hand ob-
served that expert bias in favor of the party paying compensation could
result in outcomes that are not scientifically supportable.5  Twenty years
later, famous legal scholar John Henry Wigmore noted:
But the practice [of using expert witnesses] under the present
method has for years exhibited shortcomings which are
lamentable.
. . . .
The principle feature of the breakdown seems to be the dis-
trust of the expert witness, as one whose testimony is shaped by
his bias for the party calling him.  That bias itself is due, partly to the
special fee which has been paid or promised him, and partly to
his prior consultation with the party and his self-committal to a
particular view.  His candid scientific opinion thus has had no
1. Andrew W. Jurs, Balancing Legal Process with Scientific Expertise: Expert Witness
Methodology in Five Nations and Suggestions for Reform of Post-Daubert U.S. Reliability
Determinations, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1329, 1396 (2012) (footnote omitted).
2. Id. at 1387 (footnotes omitted).
3. Id. at 1380 (footnote omitted).
4. See id.; see also Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative
Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277 (2002); Adam Liptak, In U.S., Expert Witnesses Are
Partisan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/12/us/
12experts.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/HL9Y-6HU9].
5. See generally Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding
Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901).
2
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fair opportunity of expression, or even formation, swerved as he
is by this partisan committal.6
More recent criticism is even more pointed.  A commentator from the
University of Georgia College of Law described expert witnesses as “merce-
naries, prostitutes, or hired guns . . . whose opinions are sold to the high-
est bidder.”7  Professor Joseph Sanders of the University of Houston Law
Center observed:
It is the legal system’s commitment to adversarialism in the form
of party control of expert witnesses that creates substantial pres-
sures on experts to adopt a more party-oriented point of view.
. . . .
Party control over the selection of experts produces bias not
only by pushing experts to a more one-sided view than the indi-
vidual expert might express if placed in a different role; it pro-
duces bias in the selection process itself.  Witnesses are chosen
because they prefer a point of view, and the very choice of ex-
perts clouds the degree of consensus that may surround a topic.8
Even harsher were the words of Professor Jeffrey L. Harrison of the Uni-
versity of Florida Levin College of Law:
 Unlike virtually any other business, expert witnesses are not
typically held accountable in either tort or contract law for their
commercial activities.  This means that many are inclined to de-
liver what the market demands—partisan, biased, or plainly dis-
honest testimony—without concern for the costs this testimony
may impose on others.  This immunity from the internalization
of the social cost of their testimony is hard to reconcile with any
moral or economic standard.9
The language outlined above mirrors what many other legal commenta-
tors have written.10
6. 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 563 (2d ed. 1923).
7. Yunwei Jiang, Reconsidering the Medical Expert Witness System 3 (Jan. 1,
2006) (unpublished LL.M thesis, University of Georgia School of Law) (on file
with Digital Commons @ Georgia Law).
8. Joseph Sanders, Science, Law, and the Expert Witness, 72 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Winter 2009, at 63, 74, 76–77.
9. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current
Controls and Proposed Responses, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 253 (2001).
10. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Par-
tial) Failure of the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451 (2008); Edward K.
Cheng, Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past and Present, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1387 (2006); Michael H. Graham, Impeaching the Professional Expert Witness by a Show-
ing of Financial Interest, 53 IND. L.J. 35 (1977); Susan Haack, Irreconcilable Differences?
The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2009,
at 1; Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 1009 (2008); David M. Paciocco, Unplugging Jukebox Testimony in an
3
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Expert witnesses themselves have begun to complain about pressure
from lawyers and unethical dilemmas faced by expert witnesses in a parti-
san system.11  In a particularly poignant letter of confession, former expert
witness Steven Moss wrote an op-ed entitled Opinion for Sale: Confessions of
an Expert Witness in which he stated:
 Every day, in courtrooms across the country, economists, statis-
ticians, engineers, doctors, and psychologists raise their right
hand and swear to tell the truth.  Expert witnesses are used in all
types of cases . . . .
. . . .
As my experience . . . taught me, experts, who are hired and
paid by one side in a case, get compensated for saying what the
lawyers want to hear.  The lawyers invite potential witnesses to
their offices for interviews and pepper them with questions, but
the question they care most about is “Can you prove my case?”
With such a big paycheck on the line, it’s easy to find your-
self looking for ways to answer “yes.”  The expert’s thought pro-
cess goes something like this: In most cases, both sides have
experts, so it’s perfectly ethical for me to focus on demonstrating
that my client is right and that the opposition is wrong.  After all,
the opposing side will have an expert to do the same, and every-
thing will balance out.
Once you start thinking this way, it’s easy for an expert, his
training in the scientific method of inquiry notwithstanding, to
drift further and further away from analytic neutrality.  No one is
lying, exactly, but this isn’t a search for truth.
. . . .
A [few years ago], I [realized] that I was increasingly argu-
ing—in the courtroom and on the tube—on behalf of interests
that I didn’t care about or flatly opposed . . . .
But what troubled me even more was the recognition that
the system wasn’t as fair and balanced as I had led myself to be-
lieve.  While it’s true that there’s more than one side to every
argument, more often than not only one has the financial re-
sources to get its story heard.  Not everyone has access to a top-
Adversarial System: Strategies for Changing the Tune on Partial Experts, 34 QUEEN’S L.J.
565 (2009); Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473,
482 (1986) (“An expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost any factual
theory, no matter how frivolous . . . .”).
11. See Thomas G. Gutheil, Michael Lamport Commons & Patrice Marie
Miller, Withholding, Seducing, and Threatening: A Pilot Study of Further Attorney Pres-
sures on Expert Witnesses, 29 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 336 (2001); Michael J.
Saks, Accuracy v. Advocacy: Expert Testimony Before the Bench, 90 TECH. REV.,
Aug.–Sept. 1987, at 42, 43–49; John B. Molloy, The Difficulties of Being an Expert
Witness, NEWSL. 7(5) (H.K. Int’l Sch.), May 1998, available at http://www.hkis
.org.hk/ufiles/ar04.pdf [http://perma.cc/627G-SKDX].
4
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shelf expert at $600 an hour.  The winner is too often the side
wealthy enough to purchase the highest-caliber experts.  The
pretense that I was just a necessary cog in the adversarial process
became increasingly hard to believe.12
Concerns about America’s partisan expert system have not escaped
the attention of mainstream media, either.  In 2008, the New York Times
published an article entitled In U.S., Expert Witnesses Are Partisan.13  The
Times quoted famed trial lawyer Melvin Belli as stating, “If I got myself an
impartial witness . . . I’d think I was wasting my money.”14  The Times also
quoted University of Michigan Law Professor Samuel R. Gross:
 To put it bluntly, in many professions, service as an expert
witness is not considered honest work . . . .  The contempt of
lawyers and judges for experts is famous.  They regularly describe
expert witnesses as prostitutes.15
Judges have also leveled criticism at the traditional method of
presenting adversarial expert evidence.  In a 2002 report predicated upon
a survey of all active federal district court judges, the Federal Judicial
Center reported that the biggest problem with expert testimony is that
“[e]xperts abandon objectivity and become advocates for the side that
hired them.”16  In a case almost dripping with sarcasm, a Maryland appel-
late court stated:
 In recent years the courts in Maryland and elsewhere have ex-
perienced the phenomenon of the “professional expert” whose
opinions are ofttimes shaded in favor of the party who pays his or
her fee.  With the existence of locator services, a resourceful at-
torney can contact an expert to testify on nearly any subject that
12. Steven Moss, Opinion for Sale: Confessions of an Expert Witness, LEGAL AFF.
(Mar.–Apr. 2003), http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2003/re-
view_marapr03_moss.msp [http://perma.cc/RS9Y-EDM4].
13. See Liptak, supra note 4.
14. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Similarly, the Los Angeles Times
rhetorically asked in an article about kidnapping: “Do expert witnesses provide
reliable testimony to help jurors decide a criminal case?  Or are they paid advo-
cates obligated to provide favorable testimony for the party footing the bill?” See
Associated Press, Sex Slave Case Judge Hits Value of Expert Witnesses, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
12, 1986, http://articles.latimes.com/1986-01-12/local/me-27263_1_expert-wit-
nesses [http://perma.cc/GKE4-RSUQ] (questioning the value of expert wit-
nesses); see also Ellen O’Brien, Rent an Opinion: The Expert Witness ‘Industry’, PHILA.
INQUIRER (May 11, 1986), http://articles.philly.com/1986-05-11/news/26047406_
1_expert-rainy-night-legal-system [http://perma.cc/2XSP-RU47].
16. See Carol Krafka, Meghan A. Dunn, Molly Treadway Johnson, Joe S. Cecil
& Dean Miletich, Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding Ex-
pert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 328 (2002).
This rating was generated by asking the respondent to use a scale of 1 (very infre-
quent) to 5 (very frequent) to denote the frequency with which they encountered
a particular problem. See id. at 314.
5
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calls for the opinion of an expert.  Seemingly, an “expert” can be
found to testify to virtually anything.  In Maryland, as in most
other parts of the country, if an attorney needs an expert medical
witness to state that the plaintiff suffered a whiplash injury caused
by a rear-end collision, call Dr. A; if the defense needs a medical
expert to dispute that fact, call Dr. B.17
In some cases, courts have begun to reject the testimony of experts who
are deemed to be little more than cheerleaders for their clients’
position.18
To be intellectually fair, any evaluation of expert testimony must ac-
knowledge that many experts are honest and adhere to the rigors of scien-
tific inquiry.  For as many times as an expert will skew his or her testimony
in favor of the party who is paying the bills, there are undoubtedly other
occasions where potential experts will quietly tell a client, “I cannot, with
intellectual integrity, support what you are suggesting.”  It is impossible to
quantify the number of potential civil cases that simply evaporate because
the plaintiff’s lawyer cannot support a theory with credible expert testi-
mony.  For each of these potential disputes that never become actual
cases, the contemplated defendant never has to hire counsel or expend
any cost of defense.
Acknowledging that there are advantages to a partisan system of ex-
pert testimony still does not cure the problem created by the perception
of partiality.  An increasingly cynical public is exposed, on a daily basis, to
partisan political parties and even allegedly partisan news outlets.  When
these members of the public are called upon to serve as jurors, they will
invariably view even the most intellectually rigorous of experts through a
prism that focuses upon the source of that expert’s compensation—and
the amount of the compensation paid to experts is staggering.
In America, expert witness services now represent a billion dollar in-
dustry.  In fact, three expert witness firms are now publicly traded on Wall
Street.19  Employing a survey of over 1,000 expert witnesses in over 300
fields of expertise, SEAK, Inc. published the national guide to expert wit-
nesses’ fees and billing procedures in 2004.20  In that guide, SEAK re-
17. Wrobleski v. de Lara, 708 A.2d 1086, 1091–92 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998)
(footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
18. See, e.g., In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig.,
524 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Pop v. Yarborough, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1132,
1140–41 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan.
1984). But see Donahoe v. Arpaio, Nos. CV 10–02756–PHX–NVW, CV11–009
02–PHX–NVW, 2013 WL 5604349, at *10 (D. Ariz. Oct. 11, 2013) (declaring that
when jury is factfinder, “general rule” is that “bias is not a permissible reason for
the exclusion of expert testimony” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
19. See Steven Feola & Richard A. Alcorn, Expert Witness Advocacy: Changing Its
Culture, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Mar. 2009, at 24, 24, available at https://www.myazbar.com/
AZAttorney/PDF_Articles/0309expert.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA59-427L].
20. ALEX BABITSKY, STEVEN BABITSKY & JAMES J. MANGRAVITI, JR., SEAK, INC.,
NATIONAL GUIDE TO EXPERT WITNESS FEES AND BILLING PROCEDURES (2004).
6
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ported that almost all experts charge for their time “portal-to-portal.”21
The average rate charged by experts for in-court testimony was reported as
$385 per hour, and the average preparation time charged by experts was
$254 per hour.22  Moreover, most experts imposed a minimum daily
charge for time spent in court or in a deposition.23  Even in relatively
small Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, we routinely encounter expert wit-
nesses who are paid $5,000 per day.  When one recognizes that this daily
compensation can represent up to one-quarter of many jurors’ annual in-
come, it becomes easy to recognize why jurors view experts with skepticism
and even cynicism.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The law provides an alternative to the use of partisan experts.  Both
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence
contain a Rule 706 that authorizes court-appointment of independent ex-
pert witnesses.24  Federal Rule of Evidence 706 states:
On a party’s motion or on its own, the court may order the par-
ties to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed
and may ask the parties to submit nominations.  The court may
appoint any expert that the parties agree on and any of its own
choosing.  But the court may only appoint someone who con-
sents to act.25
Federal Rule of Evidence 706 outlines the role that must be played by a
court-appointed expert, authorizes the court to disclose the expert’s court-
appointed nature, and states “this rule does not limit a party in calling its
own experts.”26  Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 706 is similar and
provides:
Where the court has appointed an expert witness, the witness ap-
pointed must advise the parties of the witness’s findings, if any.
The witness may be called to testify by the court or any party.
The witness shall be subject to cross-examination by any party,
including a party calling the witness.  In civil cases, the witness’s
deposition may be taken by any party.27
21. Id. at 7.  SEAK reported that 86% of experts charge for all time spent
between the time they leave their office and return to it. Id.
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id. at 4–5.
24. Because FED. R. EVID. 706 and PA. R. EVID. 706 share the same number
and are substantially similar in their focus, both will hereafter be collectively refer-
enced as Rule 706.
25. FED. R. EVID. 706.
26. Id.
27. PA. R. EVID. 706.
7
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Both of the above rules are the logical extension of a long-standing
common law precept that authorizes judges to question witnesses.28  This
common law authority was summarized by one widely-respected commen-
tary as follows:
The [judicial] system is a means to the end of disclosing truth
and administering justice.  In order to achieve that same end, the
judge may exercise various powers to intervene to supplement
the parties’ evidence.
More specifically, the judge has the powers to call and ques-
tion witnesses.  Under the case law and Federal Rule of Evidence
614(b), the judge has discretion to examine any witness to clarify
testimony or to bring out needed facts omitted by the parties.
The trial judge is not a mere umpire or passive moderator.  Some
appellate courts have even gone to the length of stating that the
trial judge may have a “duty” to question witnesses.29
Most American judges do not independently appoint experts, largely
due to a self-perceived fear of interfering with the adversarial process.30
However, this is changing.  An ever-expanding body of case law is evolving
under Rule 706.  In Gorton v. Todd,31 the Federal Court for the Eastern
District of California determined that Rule 706 could be invoked when a
judge weighs the following factors:
(1) Whether expert testimony is necessary or significantly useful
for the trier of fact to comprehend a material issue in a case.
(2) Whether the moving party has produced some evidence, ad-
missible or otherwise, that demonstrates a serious dispute that
could be resolved or understood through expert testimony.
(3) Whether certain circumstances or conditions of a party limit
the effectiveness of the adversary process to result in accurate
factfinding.
28. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lanza, 323 A.2d 178, 179–80 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1974) (holding that defendant’s right to fair and impartial trial were not
prejudiced by judge’s direct questioning of witnesses).
29. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 8, at 37–39 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 7th
ed. 2013) (footnotes omitted); see also United States v. Catalan-Roman, 585 F.3d
453, 471 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that trial judge is not “mere umpire,”  but rather
“governor” of trial with right to participate actively); Stevenson v. D.C. Metro. Po-
lice, 248 F.3d 1187, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he precepts of fair trial and judicial
objectivity do not require a judge to be inert.” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 685 F. Supp. 2d 293, 297 (D.P.R.
2010) (stating that judge is not “bloodless automaton” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
30. See Andrew W. Jurs, Questions from the Bench and Independent Experts: A
Study of the Practices of State Court Judges, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 47 (2012).  In this
article, Professor Jurs conducted a survey that revealed that 77% of state trial
judges have yet to appoint an independent expert due to “concerns about interfer-
ence with adversarial norms.” See id. at 78.
31. 793 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
8
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(4) Whether the legal basis of plaintiff’s claim entitles him to
special consideration by the courts.32
Essentially, the court in Gorton declared that Rule 706 could be helpful
when the amount in controversy is significant and when circumstances
arise that would inhibit the fact-finder’s ability to discern truth based ex-
clusively upon the parties’ partisan experts.33
Well-known Judge Richard Posner and United States Supreme Court
Justice Steven Breyer have both written in support of court-appointed neu-
tral experts.  In a decision he authored in 1994, Judge Posner recom-
mended “asking each party’s hired expert to designate a third, a neutral
expert who would be appointed by the court to conduct the necessary
studies.”34  More recently, Judge Posner authored an opinion in which he
specifically proposed that the district court appoint a neutral expert:
 Turning to the technical statistical evidence . . . we recom-
mend that the district judge use the power that Rule 706 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence expressly confers upon him to appoint
his own expert witness, rather than leave himself and the jury
completely at the mercy of the parties’ warring experts.  The
main objection to this procedure and the main reason for its in-
frequency are that the judge cannot be confident that the expert
whom he has picked is a genuine neutral.  The objection can be
obviated by directing the party-designated experts to agree upon
a neutral expert whom the judge will then appoint as the court’s
expert.  The neutral expert will testify (as can, of course, the
party-designated experts) and the judge and jury can repose a
degree of confidence in his testimony that it could not repose in
that of a party’s witness.  The judge and jurors may not under-
stand the neutral expert perfectly but at least they will know that
he has no axe to grind, and so, to a degree anyway, they will be
able to take his testimony on faith.35
While less direct than Judge Posner, Justice Breyer noted several concerns
that occur “when law and science intersect.”36  Citing an amicus brief filed
by the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine, Justice Breyer
observed:
32. Id. at 1185.
33. Id. at 1171.
34. Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd., 34 F.3d 410, 415
(7th Cir. 1994), abrogation recognized by Advanced Tactical Ordinance Sys., LLC v.
Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2014).
35. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 665 (7th
Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
36. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
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[A] judge could better fulfill this gatekeeper function if he or she
had help from scientists.  Judges should be strongly encouraged
to make greater use of their inherent authority . . . to appoint
experts . . . . Reputable experts could be recommended to courts
by established scientific organizations, such as the National Acad-
emy of Sciences or the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science.37
For this author, the case that highlighted the need for a neutral, inde-
pendent expert was a divorce dispute that focused upon the valuation of
the husband’s dental practice.38  Both parties presented partisan experts.
Using very different but equally suspect methodologies, the husband’s ex-
pert valued the dental practice at $276,300.00, while the wife’s expert
opined a value of $614,500.00.39  To put this difference in perspective, if
the wife’s valuation represented a superstar baseball player with a batting
average of .350, then the husband’s valuation would represent a player
with a batting average of only .158.40  Simply stated, neither player—and
neither valuation—could be considered in the same league.
In a written opinion dated December 2, 2009, the jurist wrote:
We cannot in good conscience adopt either of the valuations
proffered by [the parties’ partisan experts].  Given the stakes in-
volved—in excess of a third of a million dollars in valuation dif-
ference—and given our desire to render a decision based upon
reality and not perspective, we will reject both business valuations
proffered by both parties.41
Citing Rule 706, we gave the following reasons for our decision to appoint
a neutral independent expert:
37. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  After
quoting this passage from the New England Journal of Medicine’s brief, Justice
Breyer added the following:
Given this kind of offer of cooperative effort, from the scientific to the
legal community, and given the various Rules-authorized methods for fa-
cilitating the courts’ task, it seems to me that Daubert’s gatekeeping re-
quirement will not prove inordinately difficult to implement; and that it
will help secure the basic objectives of the Federal Rules of Evidence;
which are, to repeat, the ascertainment of truth and the just determina-
tion of proceedings.
Id.; see also JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 116
(1995) (explaining court should sometimes “go beyond the experts proffered by
the parties,” and “utilize its powers to appoint independent experts under Rule
706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence”).
38. Davis v. Davis, No. 2006–20176 (Pa. D. & C. Dec. 2, 2009).
39. See id.
40. The algebraic formula used for this calculation is as follows:
If 61,400,000 =  .350x, then x = 1,754,285, then
276,300 = .158x.
41. Davis, No. 2006–20176, at 17–18.
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(1) We have rejected the valuation opinions rendered by both
the experts who testified before the Special Master.  Both expert
opinions are flawed to such a degree that it would be patently
unfair for us to adopt either.
(2) Although we have the authority to formulate a compromise
value of our own that does not match the opinion of either ex-
pert, we candidly admit that we lack the expertise to do so.
(3) Had both experts used an identical valuation methodology,
it might have been possible for us to compute a compromise val-
uation by substituting our own component data for any non-cred-
ible data used by experts.  Unfortunately, the two experts who
testified in this case used completely different valuation models.
We lack the training and expertise to choose between those
models.
(4) Although we doubt that the true value of HUSBAND’s busi-
ness is as high as [wife’s expert] estimates or as low as [husband’s
expert] calculates, it is possible that a credible analysis based
upon generally accepted accounting principles could yield a re-
sult similar to the opinions of one of the current experts.  For us
to simply use a figure that “splits the difference” would be to en-
gage in blatant speculation.  We prefer not to do so.
(5) In many cases, a significant obstacle to using court-appointed
experts is the cost involved.  In this case, that is an obstacle easily
hurdled.  These parties possess assets in excess of $3,000,000.
The difference in competing valuations alone exceeds one-third
of a million dollars.  Given the assets of the parties and the stakes
involved, we do not perceive that cost should be a factor that
would prevent Court-appointment of an expert.42
III. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF INVOKING RULE 706
From the admittedly less-than-comprehensive vantage point of this
small county trial judge, the appointment of independent experts under
Rule 706 can be beneficial in numerous respects:
(1) Cost reduction—Expert witnesses are expensive.  In a parti-
san expert case, both parties hire separate experts and each sepa-
rately pays for the advice and analysis that the expert provides.  If
the parties could agree to a court-appointed expert, they would
divide the cost, thereby lowering each side’s expert expenses by
up to 50%.
42. Id. at 20–21.  After reaching the above conclusions, this Jurist ordered
both parties to provide the names of three possible neutral experts.  One name
appeared on both lists, and we appointed him to conduct an evaluation.  The num-
ber he generated was between the two extremes proffered by the partisan experts,
but was much closer to the valuation number that the husband advocated.
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(2) Unvarnished expression of opinion—Utilization of a court-
appointed expert eliminates the “hired gun” perception.  The
only allegiance of a court-appointed expert is to the truth, and
fact-finders will quickly recognize and appreciate this fact.
(3) Avoiding speculation—When two partisan experts provide
disparate opinions, it will invariably become tempting for a fact-
finder to “split the difference” between the parties’ two extremes.
But this may not always reflect the truth.  Moreover, the “split the
difference” approach would inevitably encourage both parties to
proffer even more extreme and unsupportable opinions so that
the so-called “middle ground” is closer to the result the party
wishes to achieve.  The Davis case chronicled above is a perfect
example of how an independent expert can help avoid specula-
tion.  The neutral expert appointed by the court in Davis ren-
dered an opinion that was between the extremes of the two
parties, but was nevertheless significantly closer to the opinion of
the husband’s expert than it was to that of the wife’s expert.  Had
we speculated that “splitting the difference” would be fair, we ac-
tually would have valued the husband’s dental practice at an un-
realistically high figure.  Instead, the independent expert allowed
us to fairly and accurately divide the parties’ marital estate.
(4) Foundational education—An independent expert can be
helpful to educate a fact-finder on foundational scientific princi-
ples about which the parties themselves may not actively disagree.
For example, an independent expert could “brief” the jury re-
garding underlying principles even before adversarial testimony
begins.  In such a process, the jury would have a basic under-
standing of the scientific foundation upon which the parties’ ad-
versarial testimony could be constructed.  Moreover, every court
must recognize that understanding is a predicate to acceptance,
and jurors have a tendency to afford credibility to the expert who
initially educates them to the point of understanding.  Ap-
pointing an independent expert to educate the jurors precludes
the risk that a juror will place undue weight on the first expert
who can provide an understandable explanation of what may be
undisputed scientific principles.
(5) Debunking junk science—In their role as gatekeepers of evi-
dence, judges are required to determine whether a scientific the-
ory is reliable enough to be admitted in evidence.  In federal
courts, these questions are submitted via a so-called Daubert chal-
lenge.43  In Pennsylvania, on the other hand, these types of chal-
lenges are submitted via what is commonly referred to as a Frye
43. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also, e.g., Oddi
v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2000) (denying expert testimony under
Daubert standard).
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motion.44  Either way, the judge is asked to define whether a wit-
ness’s theory is scientifically legitimate or merely “junk.”  When
these very difficult questions are presented, judges can employ
Rule 706 to appoint an expert who can assist in distinguishing
science from hopeful conjecture.  As stated by Professor Howard
M. Erichson, “courts often use their own scientific experts not to
testify to a jury, but rather to advise the court on such matters as
the admissibility of other scientific evidence.”45
(6) Promoting settlement—The appointment of an indepen-
dent expert can be helpful in promoting an amicable resolution
to a dispute.  Judge Masterson of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania put it this way:
We might also note that in the last two and a half years
this Court has appointed impartial medical experts in ap-
proximately a dozen cases where there were sharp disputes
between regularly appearing medical experts for plaintiffs
and defendants.  In every one of these cases, after the impar-
tial medical expert had made his study and reported to
counsel and the Court, the case was settled amicably by the
parties.  This is probably one of the most effective and desir-
able functions performed by an impartial medical expert.46
(7) Synthesizing scientifically contested issues—Issues some-
times arise where there may be “two schools of thought” within
the scientific community.  Through a Frye-Daubert motion or oth-
erwise, the parties will invariably present experts who have a
vested interest in one “school of thought” or the other.  Each
expert will refer to peer-reviewed studies that support their
school of thought without crediting any contrary research.  In
this type of situation, an independent court-appointed expert
can be tasked with the responsibility of conducting a comprehen-
sive survey of available research in order to provide the court or
the finder of fact with an untainted summary of all available
information.
(8) Keeping the parties’ experts honest—If or when the expert
witness community comes to realize that courts will employ Rule
706, experts for hire will quickly come to the realization that
their work will be subject to scrutiny by court-appointed, neutral
experts who will be cloaked with the aura of independence.  Ex-
perts will quickly learn that extremely partisan viewpoints will be
44. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also, e.g., Grady v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038 (Pa. 2003) (rejecting expert testimony under Frye
standard).
45. Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO.
L.J. 1983, 1994 (1999).
46. Nebinski v. Am. Trading & Prod. Corp., 309 F. Supp. 936, 938 (E.D. Pa.
1970).
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easier to criticize than those that may be more mainstream.  By
itself, the specter of an independent expert appointed under
Rule 706 could help promote intellectual honesty among experts
who otherwise might be tempted to push the envelope of scien-
tific legitimacy.
IV. CONCLUSION
In many ways, the current practice of employing partisan experts is
broken.  In terms of costs, it is not working for litigants.  In terms of afford-
ing unvarnished, unbiased opinion evidence from which the truth of a
dispute can be discerned, it is not working for judges or juries.  Indeed,
one could provide a compelling argument that from a societal cost-benefit
standpoint, our partisan expert process is not working for America.47  Yet
it persists as the primary paradigm for expert testimony in our courts.
Why is this so?
The primary criticism of our current system—that partisan experts
are biased in favor of the party hiring them—explains why it will be so
difficult to shift to another paradigm.  Utilizing a system of court-ap-
pointed experts requires the parties’ counsel to cede control over the pro-
cess to someone  else—and any good attorney will recognize that ceding
control creates a risk that the resulting work product could be damaging
or even deadly to their client’s chances in court.  Because of this reality, it
is unlikely that lawyers will step forward to change the existing system.  In-
deed, it is possible that the organized bar would actively oppose any move
designed to shift control over expert testimony from counsel to courts.
No one can or should declare the death of America’s partisan expert
system.  In some form, adversarial expert testimony will likely continue to
have a place in American jurisprudence.  However, every case where an
expert overreaches as a result of partisan perspective further wounds the
credibility of our current system and brings us closer to the day where
courts—or perhaps even legislatures—will mandate a new expert witness
paradigm.
The time has arrived for both judges and litigants to employ Rule 706
to supplement or supplant testimony presented by partisan experts.  To
the extent that litigation can be considered a quest for the truth, neutral,
independent experts can facilitate this quest better than ones who are
hired and paid by parties who are looking to advocate a particular point of
view.  No longer should jurors be seen shaking their heads or rolling their
eyes in disgust when confronted with “hired guns.”  Rather, fact-finders
should be assisted in their quest for justice by independent experts who
owe allegiance to nothing other than scientific truth.
47. See Harrison, supra note 9.
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